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ABSTRACT: This research would analyze causes, characteristics and consequences of online primary elec-
tions organized by Five Star Movement (M5s), in December 2012, to select its MPs candidates. In particu-
lar, present work considers all the phases of this specific example of candidates selection process. Based 
on original and empirical data collected by C&LS research team, the work can be divided into four parts: 
after a general introduction, the article focuses its attention on the rules of the game (selectorate and 
candidacy rules) and measures the inclusion/exclusion level of the process, according to the scheme used 
by Reuven Hazan. So, this electoral study deals with the participation level and the voting distribution: 
how many people took place in the candidates selection process? How much “attractive” was the primary 
election and what was the level of competitiveness among candidates? The next part underlines the socio-
graphical characteristics of the aspires MPs: who were the candidates and among these, what was the best 
candidates’ profile? What were the variables that took some candidates to a successful results and other 
candidates to the in-success? Finally, what are the consequences of this specific case of primary elections? 
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1. Candidate selection: an outsourcing function1 
 
 Over ten years ago, a volume entirely dedicated to the study of political parties introduced 
the topic as follows: «there is a substantial and growing disaffection with many of the specific 
institutions of democracy, and no single institution is considered worse than the political party» 
(Diamond and Gunther 2001, ix). More recently, Bernard Manin, in his postscript to the Italian 
edition of his Principles of Representative Government, comments that «“distrust of political 
parties” has become a common expression» (2010, 267). Political parties are therefore neces-
sary institutions (Schattschneider 1942), while at the same time they are discredited, in crisis. 
Their bad reputation is probably the consequence of citizens’ indifference towards democratic 
politics, commonly perceived as inadequate in resolving problems (Mair 2005). However the 
crisis, aside from the causes which have provoked it, has led political parties, if purely for self-
preservation, to launch a slow, contradictory and patchy process of adaptation and, therefore, 
of transformation (Ignazi 2012).  
According to a fitting analytical framework (Seddone and Valbruzzi 2012), political parties are 
increasingly less legitimate, more vulnerable, and less attractive. These dimensions are interde-
pendent, and above all, an outward demonstration of clearly identifiable phenomena. First of 
all, parties’ growing vulnerability stems from an increase in electoral volatility that is the ever-
growing trend for electors to change their vote from one election to another. Of course, this is 
not necessarily detrimental to the general quality of a democratic system (Rombi and Venturino 
2013), but it equally shows a wear of the levels of identification with political parties. Parties’ 
lack of legitimacy and consequential reduction in attractiveness, rather, stems essentially from 
the deterioration – or we could say breakdown – of their ability to act as a bridge between the 
electoral and political classes. Political parties are now post-integrative institutions (Raniolo 
2012) whose relationship with citizens is no longer a semi-automatic reflection of their wide-
spread diffusion in society. The inevitability of this process is clearly demonstrated by a fall in 
terms of membership.   
Indeed, several researches have described the parties’ loss of appeal, showing that between 
the 70s and 80s in many European countries (Denmark, Finland, Holland and the United King-
dom) the level of membership fell by around 2/3 (Ware 1996). This dramatic decline, in fact, has 
far from halted in the Nineties (Mair and Van Biezen 2001) and in the new millennium (Van 
Biezen, Mair and Poguntke 2012).   
Considering the three well-known faces of party highlighted by Mair (1994) – party in public 
office, party in central office e party on the ground – we are more able to specify the nature of 
the crisis. If we solely take into consideration the information already cited, in fact, it is clear 
 
1
 Even if this article is a joint work, Maria Elisabetta Lanzone has made a greater contribution to para-
graphs 3 and 4, while Stefano Rombi to paragraphs 1 and 2. The authors would like to thank the members 
of the standing group Sisp “Candidate and Leader Selection” for their noteworthy support in data 
collection (www.candidateandleaderselection.eu). 
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that parties’ reputation on the ground has suffered. This reputation concerns the relationship 
between party members and electors. The political parties, in fact, appear to be completely at 
ease within the public institutions and even to have replied to a crisis external to the State with 
a strengthening of their internal roots (Katz e Mair 1995). Moreover, their growing crisis of legit-
imacy and inescapable loss of attractiveness, have led the parties – though not all and not eve-
rywhere – to change their behavior. In this context, they have been forced to find new solutions 
to reconnect themselves with electors.  
This process of adaptation/transformation certainly has an effect on the selection of candi-
dates (Gallagher and Marsh 1988; Hazan 2002; Hazan and Rahat 2006 e 2010).  This function 
was generally used in an extralegal way – except for Germany, Finland, Norway and, above all, 
the United States – and internally within the political party organizations, and therefore not in-
clusively
2
.  
How the adaptation process, brought about by the crisis, has affected this function? If we re-
strict our analysis to the Italian scenario, we note that, from 2004 (Fiorini and Venturino 2012) 
some political forces decided to intervene regarding the type of internal mechanisms for candi-
date selection, introducing an outsourcing process and, as a result, hugely increasing the level 
of inclusivity. In short, the primary elections, by which we mean the more or less open method 
for candidates’ selection, should be interpreted as a reactive action forwarded by parties, in or-
der to try to contain the avalanche of delegitimization and the lack of attractiveness. 
The theoretical context outlined above seems to accurately explain much of what has oc-
curred in the Italian political panorama. However, the particular case that we intend to analyze 
here concerns the online primary elections for parliamentary candidates, forwarded by the Five 
Star Movement (M5s) in December 2012 (gearing up for the national political elections) and 
called by Grillo and many mainstream journalists, “Parlamentarie”. At this point some decisive 
and distinctive factors should be taken into consideration. The most important of these distinc-
tive factors derives from the fact that the very same M5s party is a product of the legitimation 
crisis of the traditional political parties. In other words, the Grillo’s party (Corbetta and Gualmini 
2013) tangibly represents one of the most important indicators of the loss of legitimation of 
longstanding institutions: the anti-establishment protest. In this case the choice of a decentral-
ized and non-exclusive method for the selection of parliamentary candidates cannot be inter-
preted, as in other cases, as a reaction to a (nonexistent) crisis. The M5s’ case, in fact, even if a 
response to the Democratic Party (Pd) and center-left’s adoption of inclusive methods, marries 
very well with the hyper-democratic narrative that, real or sham, epitomizes the Movement 
from its beginning. 
The Five Star Movement constitutes the greatest change to the Italian political scene in the 
last decade and in the last political elections – held in February 2013 – it emerged as the main 
 
2
 It is necessary to clarify that, despite frequent overlapping, the selection of candidates has little to do 
with the leadership selection within the party (Pasquino and Valbruzzi 2011), despite the fact that the pro-
cesses that regulate them may seem the same.  
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party, obtaining 25.5% of electoral consensus
3
. It was a new political entity formed in 2009 
thanks to the popularity of the ex-comic Beppe Grillo and the communication strategies of the 
Casaleggio Associates, but it was also a “movement” which has gradually gained ground thanks 
to the Internet
4
. At this point, we move to the second peculiarity, related to the location in 
which the (s)election was held: the world wide web. As previously underlined, even though M5s 
activism is also organized within local communities (offline), it is doubtless that the Movement 
«has made internet and the potential offered by Web 2.0 one of its major organizational re-
sources, but also a fundamental element of its conception of politics and democracy» (Bor-
dignon and Ceccarini 2013, 1). The use of internet, therefore, rather than being an ideological 
tool, seems to be the response to a limited presence of structured local organizations – such as 
those of the Pd – able to carry out competently and effectively the so-called “political primaries 
machine”. In short, both for organizational and constitutional reasons, the M5s could not adopt 
an approach that was at once open, inclusive, (although, as we will see later, only partially) and 
also managed solely through the internet.  
If up until now we have situated the M5s process of candidates' selection within a far wider 
theoretical framework, for the evaluation of the primary elections we follow an analytical 
framework proposed by Reuven Hazan and his colleague Gideon Rahat (Hazan and Rahat 2000; 
2006; 2010). In particular, these two Israelis scholars have identified four dimensions – each ex-
amined on the basis of a guiding question – useful to establish the total level of inclusiveness 
within the selection process: candidacy (who can be selected as a party candidate?); selectorate 
(who select the candidates?); decentralization (where does the selection take place?); appoint-
ment and voting (how candidates are selected?). Each dimension can be placed along a contin-
uum whose limits are identified: on one hand, by the maximum level of exclusiveness; on the 
other, by the maximum level of inclusiveness. 
In this work we plan to examine the characteristics and the outcome of the M5s primary 
elections based on an original dataset constructed through an intensive Internet research. This 
is the only strategy available to us, in the absence of complete official data, which could offer a 
full panorama. In the next section, having examined in detail the nature of the M5s primaries 
using Hazan and Rahat’s framework, we focus on the numbers of the selection, and in particu-
lar, on the level of participation, on the distribution of votes and, finally, on the level of compet-
itiveness. Instead, in the third paragraph, we focus on the candidates’ socio-graphic characteris-
tics. Then we proceed by concentric circles, progressively tightening the level of analysis: from 
all candidates, moving onto the selected candidates and finally looking at the most successful 
 
3
 In order to analyze the electoral results of the M5s in the political elections 2013, we refer to an accu-
rate analysis by Tronconi (2013). 
4
 The M5s was founded and developed thanks to the internet, but also taking advantage of a period in 
which citizens had a limited trust in the established political organizations. This is also a distrust provoked 
by the extreme economic crisis. For the connection between crisis, distrust and the birth of populist par-
ties, see the volume by Mény and Surel (2001). 
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selected candidates (i.e. those who obtained the highest number of votes in the primaries). In 
the fourth paragraph we complete this view by discussing the outcomes and consequences of 
the primaries. On this specific point we analyze, on one hand the distinguishing characteristics 
of those elected in the M5s primaries. On the other hand instead, we put forward a comparison 
between the candidates selected by Grillo party, and those chosen by the other political parties, 
by making a comparison which takes into consideration the method of selection employed. A 
short conclusion follows. 
 
 
2. Primary elections requisites and numbers  
 
Having briefly analyzed the reasons which brought the leaders of the Movement to opt for a 
non-centralized selection, and having also placed them within the wider theoretical debate re-
garding the political party crises, it is now time to enter in medias res. We concentrate on two 
aspects related to this theme: the basic requisites by which the selectors and candidates were 
defined, and the characteristics of the competition (level of participation, vote distribution, and 
competitiveness). 
First of all, the selectorate is defined as an ensemble of those who can participate in the se-
lection of candidates: it can be composed of one, a few, or many people, up to a country’s en-
tire electorate. With the aim to considering the analytical framework indicated by Hazan and 
Rahat, using an inclusiveness/exclusiveness continuum, at one extreme we have a selectorate 
composed of the entire electorate, while at the other extreme, rather than a selectorate, there 
will be a sole selector: the party leader. The M5s online primary elections took place between 
3rd and 6th December 2012 and, as previously mentioned, it was only in part an inclusive pro-
cedure. In order to be a candidate it was necessary to meet these following criteria: to be un-
censored, not signed up to other political parties, never to have carried out in the past more 
than one electoral mandate, to reside in the electoral district in which he or she was to candi-
date himself (or herself). Moreover, in order to avoid the likely bandwagoning effect, the right 
to participate was conferred to those who had already been a candidate but never elected dur-
ing the local and regional elections in which the 5 Star Civic Lists or the M5s had already partici-
pated between 2008 and 2012. This choice cannot simply be interpreted, as the M5s would 
have us believe, as a reward for the un-elected
5
. The exclusion of elected political personnel, in 
fact, «inevitably allows for greater control from the top (by Grillo himself), and probably a 
greater dependency (even if only due to their lack of preparation) on central guidelines» 
(Gualmini 2013, 18). Analyzing the inclusiveness/exclusiveness continuum, at one extreme – 
that of maximum inclusiveness – there is the area in which every party elector is a potential 
candidate. The other end of the scale, of maximum exclusivity, corresponds with a series of re-
 
5
 On 30th November 2012 on his blog, Beppe Grillo appeared in a video in which this benevolent moti-
vation was placed at the base of regulatory decisions. 
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strictive conditions. The scenario under investigation is much closer to the second extreme than 
the first one
6
. 
The fear of “infiltration” suggests a regulated openness, even regarding the selectorate. As a 
matter of fact, all legal adults could access to Grillo’s blog and express up to three preferences 
as long as they had joined up to the M5s by 30th September 2012, and had certified their iden-
tity by uploading a document by November 2012. The M5s primaries are therefore a clear ex-
ample of closed primaries in which the opportunity to participate is offered only to party mem-
bers. However, it should be made clear that the examples surrounding participation show some 
differences. Sometimes, indeed, there are additional requisites to the mere inscription (Hazan 
2000, 176). The members’ participation to the selection process can be limited by a minimum 
period of membership prior to the candidate selection or by evidence of party activity.  
According to official figures made public two weeks after the vote, even if the number of M5s 
members were 255,339, due to the strict regulations previously cited, the number of selectors 
with the right to participate was 31,612, 64.1% of which actually took part in the vote (20,252). 
The valid votes were 57,252, and therefore only a few chose to indicate less than three prefer-
ences. There were 1,486 candidates (945 were the places potentially available); 87.1% of candi-
dates were male (1,293), while 12.9% were female (193).  
On the basis of the above-outlined regulations, it is worth looking into the participation out-
comes of the selection, as well as the level of competitiveness. In order to do this, it becomes 
crucial to focus on aggregated data.  
Usually the inferable informations from aggregated data are studied by looking at the trend 
across the national territory. In this particular case, however, a number of problems are pre-
sented because of the limited transparency concerning the whole operation which, of course, 
prevented us from working with official and complete data. In fact, the primary election organ-
izers provided more or less detailed information depending on the reference public. The “inter-
nals”, or rather those who, as candidates, had taken part in the online primaries, could consult 
all the available data (who had the right to vote, voters, votes cast), even disaggregated by dis-
trict. The “externals”, or rather all the others, had to base their evaluation on the same three 
types of data but, a key detail, gathered at national level. In short, the only numbers available 
and known to all are related to the right to vote, to the selectors and the preferences ex-
pressed. It is easy to trace the position of each candidate, without however any reference to the 
number of its preferences.   
If the data just cited was our starting point, after an in-depth research regarding the Internet 
site of Meetup active in the various constituencies, but also based on personal contacts with 
 
6
 As one can see, we have excluded two of the four dimensions of the Hazan and Rahat framework: de-
centralization and nomination/vote. The reason is very simple. With respect to the second dimension, 
there is very little to say: it is obvious, in fact, that, as it regards the primaries, the M5s candidates selec-
tion process did not take place through appointment, but rather voting. The first is also irrelevant, given 
the online nature of the selection. 
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candidates, we are now able to present a near complete scenario of the distribution of voters 
and their preferences throughout the national territory. Before looking at the data, however, it 
is necessary to take into consideration two important legal aspects. First of all, our research al-
lows us to work with 93.1% of the preferences actually expressed (53.306); 328 (out of 1,486) 
candidates’ votes are missing: 209 from the overseas districts
7
, 32 from Trentino-Alto Adige 
(North-East), 26 from Molise (South) and finally 61 from Apulia (South). Secondly, the number 
of voters presented is not a real figure, but an estimate obtained from the ratio between the 
total number of preferences and the average number of preferences given by each voter, equal 
to 2.83
8
. As example, we cite the case of Tuscany, where 3,934 preferences were attributed 
and, as a result, approximately 1,390 (3,934/2.83) selectors voted. 
As we can see from Table 1, the (estimated) number of voters is overall limited, to say the 
least. For instance, even though it is the least populated region, the fact that Aosta Valley regis-
tered only 48 selectors tells us a lot about how restricted the perimeter in which the competi-
tion was carried out was. Unsurprisingly, given its size, the highest number of voters is in Lom-
bardy (3,117). However, absolute values are not sufficient to correctly assess participation in 
each region. It is therefore necessary a participation index in order to make a comparison. Un-
fortunately, even in the case of the primaries for the parliamentary candidates, there is the 
well-known problem of the denominator (Venturino 2007). In other words, it is fairly difficult to 
identify who could be the potential voters. Actually, in the M5s primaries, the participation in-
dex could be easily calculated as the ratio between the number of voters and the number of en-
titled to vote. Nevertheless, those last data are not available disaggregated by region. Further-
more, this strategy would have excessively restricted the number of potential participants, pre-
venting a full estimation of M5s supporters’ desire for participation. A more fitting method 
could have taken into consideration the total number of Grillo’s party members
9
, independently 
of the fact that the membership was completed by 30th September 2012 and certified by an 
identification document. But not even in this circumstance it was possible to obtain disaggre-
gated data. As we know, the only available data is the number of party members at the national 
level (255,339)
10
. In order to overcome those obstacles, we compare the different regions based 
on the ratio (expressed as a percentage) between the number of voters in the online primaries 
and the number of those who voted M5s in the national elections of February 2013. Theoreti-
 
7
 As regards the foreign districts, we collected the preferences of 15 candidates, to a total of 462 pref-
erences. Moreover, given the lack of data available, we have decided to exclude them from the analysis.  
8
 The average numbers of preferences per voter is the ratio between the total number of preferences 
and number of voters. In numeric terms: 57,252/20,252 = 2.83. Of course, we are hypothesizing the same 
number of preferences expressed by every selector in every district. 
9
 This is not a true membership inscription procedure, but rather an inscription to the internal sections 
of the blog.  
10
 Overall, considering the number of the entitled to vote, the participation index is 64.1%, while apply-
ing the number of party members as the denominator, the index falls to 7.9%.  
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cally, the index varies between a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 100. However, as Table 1 
shows, the minimum participation level was 0.17% in Sicily, while the highest was 0.36% in Ao-
sta Valley. Why is it so? Because the number of voters at the primaries was a great deal less 
than the number of voters at the general elections. These data certainly could come under criti-
cism from many points of view, (starting with their excessive variability due to changes in the 
number of voters, even small ones) and, therefore, they have to be handled with care. Howev-
er, they are the only ones available to make a comparison among the different regions. 
 
Table 1 – Votes, voters and competition attractiveness 
Region Preferential voting Voters Participation Index 
Competition 
attractiveness 
Index (CA) 
Lombardy 8.822 3.117 0,28 0,06 
Aosta Valley 137 48 0,36 0,33 
Piedmont 4.639 1.639 0,23 0,41 
Liguria 2.069 731 0,24 0,26 
North-West 15.667 5.536 0,26 0,24 
Friuli V.G. 1.148 406 0,21 0,14 
Veneto 5.171 1.827 0,24 0,51 
Trentino A.A. - -     - 0,50 
North-East 6.319 2.233 0,23 0,47 
Tuscany 3.934 1.390 0,26 0,32 
Emilia-Romagna 5.324 1.881 0,29 0,40 
Umbria 933 330 0,23 0,80 
Marche 2.005 708 0,24 0,49 
‘Red Zone’ 12.196 4.310 0,26 0,50 
Lazio 7.101 2.509 0,27 0,37 
Abruzzo 1.339 473 0,20 0,26 
Sardinia 1.665 588 0,21 0,07 
Basilicata 429 152 0,20 0,68 
Molise - -     - 0,81 
Apulia - -     - 0,16 
Calabria 1.110 392 0,17 0,62 
Campania 3.609 1.275 0,19 0,21 
Sicily 3.871 1.368 0,16 0,11 
South 19.124 6.758 0,21 0,34 
Italy 53.306 18.836 0,24 0,38 
Source: authors processing based on Candidate and Leader Selection data 
Note: in the cases of Lombardy, Piedmont, Veneto, Lazio, Campania, and Siciliy, columns 4 and 5 data are calcu-
lated as the mean of sub-regional values. The same goes for inter-regional data and for national data.  
 
To begin with, even by looking at the Aosta Valley case, it is clear that moving from absolute 
to relative values we have to rethink our evaluations. Looking at the data, it comes out that the 
highest participation index was recorded in the central Italy (the so-called Red Zone) and North 
M.E Lanzone, S. Rombi, Who did participate in the online primary elections of the M5S in Italy? 
  
178 
 
West regions. In particular, besides the previously cited Aosta Valley, in Emilia-Romagna (0.29) 
and in Lombardy (0.28) the index reaches the highest values. On the other hand, the area of the 
country with the lowest participation is the South, with an overall index of 0.21 and with three 
regions (Campania, Calabria, and Sicily) which remain below 0.20. Finally, the North East falls in 
the middle, with a participation index equal to 0.23. 
Aside from the voter point of view, the appeal of an electoral contest can also be assessed 
from the candidates’ side. In this case it is worth asking how much attention has been provoked 
among the Five Star Movement supporters (the only ones who were able to put themselves 
forward). That is to say, to what extent the potential candidates have responded to their lead-
ers’ call. 
To answer the question, we refer to the last column of table 1, which shows the competition 
attractiveness index (CA). The CA index is given by the ratio between the number of selected 
candidates and the number of selectable candidates (as to say, all those who run for the nomi-
nee). However, in order to avoid high index values indicating a low level of attractiveness, we 
have reduced the figure to 1. In such a way, the CA index varies between a minimum of 0 – the 
number of selected candidates is identical to the number of selectable candidates – to a maxi-
mum, only theoretical, of 1 – the number of selected candidates is equal to zero (and there is at 
least one candidate in the primaries), a case which is obviously impossible
11
.  
Before going into the details, it is necessary to verify if the CA index is positively correlated 
with the number of places to be filled in the future electoral lists. If it was thus, in fact, the 
number of candidates would be a function of the number of places in the list, and therefore, it 
would have nothing to do with the higher or lower desire to candidate oneself on the part of 
the militants of a certain electoral district. Currently the correlation coefficient (r = 0.155) is pos-
itive, but very weak, and above all, not statistically significant. The CA index, therefore, does not 
depend on the number of seats which must be assigned in a certain electoral district.  
The index can be interpreted in two ways. A negative interpretation could adjudge the exces-
sive number of candidates with respect to the number of available seats as an indicator of a 
fierce “race for the seat”, by activists who were incapable of making it there in previous elec-
tions. Instead, from a positive standpoint, it could be read as the consequence of territorial 
penetration by the M5s. We could maintain, in fact, that the number of candidates, far higher 
than necessary, was mainly due to the deep-rooting of Grillo’s party. 
However, placing aside these interpretations (which are not mutually exclusive), it is oppor-
tune to take a closer look at the attractiveness of the Five Star Movement primaries. In line with 
the situation for the selectors, the Red Zone was the area of the country in which the attrac-
tiveness of primaries was higher. The CA index, in fact, is equal to 0.50, peaking at 0.80 in Um-
bria. However, overall the most intense candidate race was in Calabria, where the CA index 
reached 0.81. Despite the peak in Calabria, the CA index in the South overall (0.34) was lower, 
 
11
 Obviously, since in an electoral competition there must be at least one winner, the maximum possi-
ble limit is 0.9999. 
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not only compared to those in the red regions, but even those recorded in the North-East 
(0.47). Finally, in the North West the index hit its lowest level, at 0.24. Looking at the individual 
regions, it is worth noting that, just as in the case of the highest peaks, also the regions with the 
lowest index – Lombardy (0.06), Sardinia (0.07) and Sicily (0.11) – show very different social, 
economic and political characteristics. This confirms the indifference of the index not only to 
the number of places available, but also to the features of the single territories. What strikes 
us,– and compromises the validity of the hypothesis of the Movement’s deep-rooting – is the 
low value of the index in a region such as Sicily, in which M5s centrality is not only solid (if you 
think of its enormous success in 2012 regional elections), but above all symbolic. In short, if in 
such an important region the primary elections were relatively unattractive, the same appeal is 
not probably a result of the territorial rooting of Grillo’s party, but instead the desire of the non-
elected activists to obtain a prestigious political office. In any case, at this level such a conclu-
sion can only be a simple conjecture in need of a systematic empirical check. 
Hence it was a competition which saw a low participation – but, as we know, this outcome 
was willfully pursued by its organizers – and, especially in some areas of the country, as attrac-
tive to those who, possessing the right requisites, wanted to put themselves forward as candi-
dates. At this point we need to ask a question which is fundamental to electoral studies: was it a 
competitive selection?  
To provide an answer it is necessary to make reference to the Kenig index (2008): the ratio 
between the effective number of candidates
12
 (Laakso and Taagepera 1979) and their real 
number (shown in table 2). This index varies between 0 and 1 and, as opposed to others
13
, takes 
into consideration the performance of all competing candidates.  
The Kenig index is very appropriate in such situations where the distribution of percentages 
of votes between the candidates is relatively equal. Such a trend seems to be largely spread in 
the M5s primary elections. 
Figure 1 sorts the regions according to their level of competitiveness. Moreover, it groups 
them into quartiles – identified by different shades of grey – in order to graphically show the 
areas of the country in which selection is mostly competitive
14
. Indeed it is evident that, in addi-
tion to those from the Aosta Valley, the groups of regions with the highest level of competition 
were made up of Sicily, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Abruzzo and Liguria. Whereas at the other end of 
 
12
 Adopting the logic of the effective number of parties, ENC indicates the number of effective candi-
dates. The formula is: 1/∑ci
2
. Where ci is the percentage of votes obtained by the candidate i.  
13
 Among these, the closeness which takes into consideration the distance between the percentage 
votes of the top two candidates. Having carried out the calculation, we have been able to ascertain that, in 
this case, this characteristic cannot be used.  
14
 As stated, we decided to calculate the Kenig index on a regional basis. For information, we list the in-
dex for 13 districts that make up the six multi-district: Campania 1 = 0.447; Campania 2 = 0.506; Lazio 1 = 
0.451; Lazio 2 = 0.790; Lombardy 1 = 0.447; Lombardy 2 = 0.582; Lombardy 3 = 0.642; Piedmont 1 = 0.434; 
Piedmont 2 = 0.637; Sicily 1 = 0.718; Sicily 2 = 0.831; Veneto 1 = 0.524; Veneto 2 = 0.551.  
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the scale, in which the least competitive regions are grouped, we find Emilia-Romagna, Campa-
nia, Calabria and Umbria, two southern regions and two from the Red Zone. 
 
Table. 2 - The level of competitiveness 
Region N. of candidates 
N. of effective 
candidates. (ENC) 
Closeness adapted Kenig Index 
Lombardy 110 57,29 95,2 0,521 
Aosta Valley 3 2,95 96,4 0,983 
Piedmont 114 60,49 97,9 0,531 
Liguria 23 15,38 98,8 0,669 
North-West 250 136,11 97,0 0,544 
Friuli V.G. 22 15,29 99,7 0,695 
Veneto 145 77,81 97,4 0,537 
Trentino A.A. 32 -     -       - 
North-East 199 93,10 98,6 0,557 
Tuscany 79 43,86 99,4 0,555 
Emilia-Romagna 100 48,45 97,4 0,484 
Umbria 81 34,31 96,6 0,423 
Marche 47 30,26 96,9 0,644 
‘Red Zone’ 307 156,88 97,6 0,511 
Lazio 105 58,58 99,5 0,557 
Abruzzo 27 18,18 98,7 0,674 
Sardinia 27 14,28 97,2 0,529 
Basilicata 34 17,18 98,6 0,505 
Molise 26 -     -       - 
Apulia 61 -     -      - 
Calabria 78 36,26 99,5 0,465 
Campania 92 43,07 97,9 0,468 
Sicily 71 54,37 99,0 0,766 
South 521 241,92 98,6 0,557 
Italy 1277 628,01 98,0 0,542 
Source: authors processing based on Candidate and Leader Selection data. 
Note: a) in the cases of Lombardy, Piedmont, Veneto, Lazio, Campania, and Siciliy, the ENC is calculated consider-
ing the ENC registered at the sub-regional level.  
b) The Kenig index calculus is based on the ENC and on the overall number of candidates. The same procedure is 
adopted both for the inter-regional area and for the national level.  
 
According to Downs (1957), competitiveness can have an impact, not necessarily a positive 
one, on the turnout in future elections. Of course, for such a theory to be plausible and, there-
fore, subject to verification, two conditions must be present: first of all, the same primary elec-
tions must be a great occasion for participation, able to involve a considerable amount of the 
party’s electorate (or of the coalition); secondly, in the case of primaries for the parliamentary 
seats, the choice of vote at the general election should depend more on the individual candi-
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dates present in the list than on the allegiances inspired by the leader of the party.  When, as in 
the case of the M5s, the primaries were participated in by 0.23% of electors and the leader of 
the party presents himself as a master of the stage, it is totally hazardous and irrational to pre-
dict an impact of any type – that isn’t, obviously, the definition of the names of candidates – on 
future elections. For these reasons, the competitiveness analysis is merely descriptive. Howev-
er, such a description, far from being irrelevant, helps us better understand the nature of the 
competition organized by the leaders of the Movement. 
 
Figure 1 - The Competitiveness in the Italian Regions. Kenig Index  
 
 
3. Individual data: selectable and selected candidates’ profile 
 
After dealing and discussing with the general traits of the competition, we enter into details 
about individual data. In particular, firstly, we look at the whole spectrum of candidates, and, 
secondly, at the most successful candidates. For this second group we try to ascertain the rea-
sons behind their success. 
At least from a purely sociological point of view, the profile of candidates does not seem very 
different to that of a typical political seat candidate. Furthermore, there are only 193 females 
(12.9%). The average age is 43 years. Regarding their educational background, 46.9% of candi-
dates are graduates, and a third of them also have a post-graduate degree (PhD, master, spe-
cialization); 45.7% have completed high school; finally 6.3% have only a middle school certifi-
cate (around 1% of candidates did not declare their study level). Focusing our attention on job 
positions the majority of candidates are employees (around 35%); 20% are freelance profes-
sional and just over 10% self-employed. Furthermore, 7.4% are entrepreneur; 5.8% teachers; 
0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1
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6.3% production workers; 3.6% managers; 3.8% unemployed; 2.5% students; 2.3% pensioners. 
Only 0.5% are housewives (0.4% did not declare their professional status). 
Because of the nature of the candidateship regulation, no candidate had previously been in a 
similar role – either at local or national level – within other political parties, not even within the 
M5s. Only 0.5% of candidates stated in their presentation form (diffused on Grillo’s blog or in a 
short video on You Tube) to have had in the past political party membership: among them there 
were ex-militants from the Italy of Values (Idv), Italian Greens, Democratic Party of the Left 
(Pds), Italian Socialist Party (Psi) and Radical Party and even those who had carried out a brief 
period of political activity within the Northern League (Ln). 
An important element seems to be represented by the Meetup membership of candidates 
(the online platform of the M5s) and thus by their activism at a local level
15
. Indeed at the pri-
mary elections days, around 43% of candidates were, in fact, signed up to the platform and 41% 
of these members performed a high level role within a local group: organizer, co-organizer and 
assistant-organizer. As we shall see, the local groups – which today number around 1,220
16
 – 
carried out an important role during the selection process phases, as well as later on in the 
course of the national electoral campaign. 
They were a sort of “electoral committee” able to act as a springboard for candidates, often 
unknown at national level, but already active in local groups for many years.  
Having outlined the sociological and political backgrounds of candidates, it is fitting to look at 
the winners of the selection. To begin with, there were 822 winners (55.3% of the total): 556 
were inserted in the lists for the Chamber of Deputies (based on their age) and 266 in the Sen-
ate lists.  
Firstly, among the selected candidates the number of Meetup members increases: if within 
the total number of candidates, the number of members stops 43%, within the selected candi-
dates it reaches 55%. The number of women also increases. Considering the whole spectrum of 
primary candidates, the number of women was slightly below 13%, within the selected candi-
dates the female presence reached 18.3%. The average age of candidates remains mainly un-
changed, passing from 43 to 41 years old. Also regarding to education and job positions the 
scenario does not change: the number of graduate candidates prevails, along with 35% of em-
ployees and 20% freelance professionals.  
 
15
 A multimedia platform used (from 2005 onwards) by groups of supporters of the Genoan ex-comic. 
The tool allowed hundreds of local groups to join together, to meet offline and sometimes to organize 
themselves during administrative (local and regional) elections, while maintaining a relative autonomy 
from the national staff.  
16
 The figure is from 31th August 2013. The number of Meetup groups saw a peak during the electoral 
period, when new groups were formed. After the general elections of February 2013, the number of 
groups has slightly been decreased (with the closure of groups which had only been formed by the elec-
toral committee of some districts). For more precise and detailed analysis, see Mosca (2013). 
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In short, what emerges is that selectors had a relative preference for women and candidates 
who were most active at the local level. 
Further restricting the analysis, we focus on those candidates who were able to gain a num-
ber of votes that allowed them to win the first places in the list. Such a placement, in many cas-
es, led to a safe victory in the parliamentary ballot.  
First of all, among the 54 top-list candidates (36 men and 18 women located at the top of the 
M5s’s electoral lists for the Chamber of Deputies or Senate), only 42 entered into Parliament in 
the XVII legislature. In particular, 7 out of 12 non-elected top-list candidates came from foreign 
districts. Moreover, neither the top-list candidates of Molise were elected, nor the two compet-
ing in the single member district of Aosta Valley and, lastly, nor the top-list candidate for the 
senatorial elections of Trentino-Alto Adige.  
However, aside from the cited figures, the most interesting aspect concerns the reasons that 
allowed these candidates – potentially unknown at a national level and “unfamiliar” with poli-
tics – to win a noteworthy level of support. 
First of all, what have played a prime role in the winning of votes seems to have been – ra-
ther than the presentation video or their “programmatic curriculum” – their political past, or 
rather their past as activists, which was adapted into the organization of meetings of a local na-
ture, diffused through the web platform Meetup. 
Within Meetup – despite the overemphasis on the rhetoric of horizontality – there is a kind 
of pyramid which gives life to the organizational flow which attributes operative roles to some 
activists. 
Naturally, carrying out a top level role worked in the favor of candidates, as it offered them a 
greater level of popularity. In stronger terms, we can sustain that, given the excluding charac-
teristics of the rules of the game, having (or not) a role within a local group often proved deci-
sive for the winning candidate
17
. More precisely, within the Meetup groups it was possible to 
identify four levels and therefore several organizational roles: in addition to that of humble 
member, at the top there are the organizers (who set up the Meetup) who are assisted by co-
organizer and by assistant organizer. These two figures act as a kind of staff, able to assist the 
organizer during events, local meetings, and administrative election campaigns.  
Looking at the data, we notice that 26 out of 38 top-list candidates signed up to the Meetup 
platform, are a part of a group active at the municipal level. For this reason, they won their 
popularity at a ‘super’ local level. Only 16 top-list candidates were not signed up to any Meetup 
in the period of the primaries. 
If among all the candidates the majority was simply member (59%), in the top-list candidates, 
the assistant organizer and co-organizer (54%) prevail, making a total of Meetup members 
 
17
 A few concrete examples can be instructive: in the Lombardy district 3, the candidate with the high-
est percentage of votes (14%) held for some time the position of organizer in the province of Pavia. An-
other interesting case was in Sardinia, where a candidate was able to win over 15% of preferences: in this 
case, his first level role could be considered his activity within the territory, carried out since 2005 and, 
therefore, in a period prior to the official formation of the M5s. 
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equal to 71%. In short it is evident that the success of candidates is related to the activity car-
ried out previously at a local level. Only in wider electoral constituencies – therefore with a 
larger number of seats available (Lazio, Piedmont) – candidates less active at the local level 
have been able to really compete. 
 
 
4. Outcomes and consequences of the selection process 
 
   What specific impact did the selection process have? This is the main question of the para-
graph. Having outlined the most salient points of the primary election, it is worth considering its 
final outcomes and its consequences, which should be measured looking at the arrangement of 
the new Parliament. 
The M5s primaries have produced more a kind of “recognition among similar people” (Mosca 
and Vaccari 2013), than a real moment of political participation. However, the first experiment 
of an online primary had a significant impact on the public opinion
18
 and short term effects on 
some traditional parties which, in part affected by the Grillo’s party, decided to select (although 
with different rules and means) their aspiring parliamentarians through a primary election
19
. 
We examine the outcomes of the selection, focusing on some of the socio-graphic character-
istics of the primary winners elected in Parliament. We also compare these data against those 
discussed in paragraph 3, related to the various phases of the selection process.  
Instead, the consequences affect the structure of the new Parliament. In particular, it would 
be very useful to understand what impact the M5s selection process had on renewing the par-
liamentary class. To achieve this goal, we compare the characteristics of parliamentary groups, 
whose member were elected solely by primaries (M5s), with those groups whose members 
were chosen partially by this method (Pd and Left, Ecology and Freedom - Sel), as well as with 
those parliamentarians selected solely by the party leadership (People of Freedom - Pdl, Ln, Civ-
ic Choice - Sc, Brothers of Italy - Fdi).  
Looking at the outcome – that is the change in characteristics of the M5s parliamentary 
group compared with the overall online primary candidates – we remark that, shifting from the 
three areas of analysis (selectable candidates, selected candidates, top-list candidates) to the 
elected in Parliament, the gender ratio is reversed and men return to be predominant.  
As figure 2 shows, for example, if the female presence among top-list candidates is equal to 
66%, considering who is elected as MP it stops at 38%. However this figure is not negligible. In 
fact, as we know, woman selectable candidates were only 13%.   
 
18
 http://www.beppegrillo.it/2013/01/tsunami_tour.html. As you can see from the videos, during al-
most every stage of his electoral “Tsunami Tour”, Grillo used the online primaries as a slogan capable of 
stressing how central direct democracy is in the Movement political philosophy.  
19
 The reference is to Pd and Sel, which on 29th and 30th December 2012 held primary elections to se-
lect the majority of their candidates.  
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Looking again at primaries outcome, another interesting comparison concerns the average 
age of the candidates. We know that, overall, the average age of the primary candidates was 42 
years old, but the selection process in fact lowered the average age. Among the top-list candi-
dates the average age is 38 years old. However, the most relevant point is that the average of 
the new-parliamentarians is just 36 years old. More specifically, around 30% of M5s’ new mem-
bers of Parliament are under 29 years old.  
 
Figure. 2 – Female Presence from Primaries to Parliament (percentage terms) 
 
The other comparison is about Meetup membership:  figure 3 shows that the members of 
the M5s’ online territorial platform are largely overrepresented both among the top-list candi-
dates, and among the elected in Parliament. In fact, as we know, 43% of all the selectable can-
didates were composed by Meetup members. This percentage, however, reached 71% for the 
top-list candidates and 70% among the new parliamentarians.  
In general, therefore, if we focus on the profile of the elected in Parliament, we underline a 
strong presence of young (even if not very young) candidates who are active within the Meetup. 
The percentages regarding job position are unaltered, with employees at 35% in all phases of 
the selection process. Instead, there is a slight rise in the presence of graduates among those 
elected in Parliament. The M5s electors
20
 and selectors have thus followed similar voting strat-
egies. They have not looked at professional or educational elements. Instead, they have re-
warded those who fall in a relatively younger age range. The only relevant difference in behav-
ior concerns the gender. The vote of selectors favored women, while that of the electors pro-
duced a predominantly male parliamentary group.  
 
20
 As it is known, the electors had not a vote of preference. Their power was that of approving or rejecting 
the list emerging from the primaries.  
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Figure. 3 – Presence of Meetup members from Primaries to Parliament (percentage terms) 
 
Anyway, the most important effects of the candidate selection process concern its conse-
quences on the composition of the Parliament. That is, the political arena in which selected (and 
then elected) candidates are involved.  
The candidate selection process may affect the peculiarities of new MPs. To test this hypoth-
esis, we compare the composition of the different groups on the basis of two important indica-
tors of renewal: the number of women and the number of young parliamentarians.  
First of all, M5s has brought to Parliament 163 MPs: 109 in the Chamber of Deputies (37 
women) and 54 in the Senate (25 women)
21
. However, the key point is that the Grillo’s group is, 
at Montecitorio, the second ranking for female representation (33.9%). The first place is held by 
the Pd, with 37.9% female representatives. If we exclude Sel – with 27% female deputies – in 
the other groups the percentage of women is far lower. It should be highlighted that the North-
ern League decided to elect all of its women in the Senate
22
. 
In the Senate the M5s elected the highest number of women (47.1%). The Pd follows with 
40.7% and the Ln with 30%. Women’s presence in the Centre-Right is fairly limited. 
Referring to the second indicator of renewal, we analyze only the groups’ arrangement with-
in the Chamber of Deputies (young candidates, between 25 and 40 years old, can be elected as 
deputies only). In this case, the deputies are divided both on the basis of the list of election and 
of their age-cohort. In particular, we identify five cohorts: under 30, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, and 
over 60. The M5s has the greatest number of parliamentarians between 25 and 29 years 
 
21
 Presently (September 2013), the M5s’s parliamentarians are 155.  
22
 Those percentages are calculated on the basis of the parliamentary groups’ composition at the begin-
ning of the XVII legislature (15th March 2013).  
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(25.6%). The Ln and the Pd follows with, respectively, 5% and 4,4% of under 30
23
. The most rep-
resented age-cohort is that of members aged between 30 and 39 years. These count for 67.8% 
of the M5s group; 40% of the Northern League group; 35% of the Pdl group; 27% of the Sel par-
liamentary group; and, finally, almost 21% of the democrats. While within M5s group the most 
common age-cohort is 30-39 years, within Pd and Sel the most represented are those between 
50 and 59 years: in both cases, they are around 35%.  
If we group together the parliamentary groups on the basis of their candidate selection pro-
cess (primaries; primaries and party leaders choice; just party leaders choice), the scenario in 
figure 4 emerges.  
 
Figure. 4 – Type of Selection process and MP’s gender (percentage terms) 
 
Figure 4 clearly shows how the M5s parliamentarians – all selected through primary elections 
– are largely the youngest. The 95.4% of them are aged 39 or younger. It goes without saying 
that such an exceptional percentage cannot solely be attributed to the type of selection adopt-
ed. If it was thus, in fact, among the Pd and Sel parliamentarians chosen through primary elec-
tions we would have found similar percentages. Actually, only 25,4% of their deputies are young 
and if we consider those selected through the primaries the number increases only by a few 
percent. Considering the parties that have selected their candidates through party leaders’ 
nominations, the amount of young members falls to 14%. In summary, primary elections favor 
younger age-cohorts and this occurred in more significant proportions within the Grillo’s party.  
All in all, partly because of the M5s, the one of XVII legislature is a deeply-transformed Par-
liament. If we compare it with that of the XVI legislature (2008-2013), we notice that there is 
both a higher under 30 representation – with a lowering of the average age in the Senate as 
 
23
 The overall percentage of under 30 within the Chamber of Deputies is equal to 7%.  
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well –, as well as a higher female representation. At the beginning of the current XVII legisla-
ture, the number of under 30 representatives was 7.6%. A surprisingly high percentage consid-
ering that this age-cohort was completely absent in past legislature. On the contrary, looking at 
the 30-39 years deputies, we remark that they have risen to almost 23 percentage points, com-
pared with previous legislature. As concerns the gender, it should be highlighted that presently 
women constitute 31% of the parliamentarians (32% in the Chamber of Deputies and 30% in the 
Senate). This is an increase of 50% compared with the already significant level (at least by Italian 
standards) reached in the past legislature, when female parliamentarians totaled 20.9% (22.2% 
in the Chamber of Deputies and 18.5% in the Senate).  
What we have said so far does not fully cover the issue of primary elections consequences. 
However, it is obviously still complicated to examine in an exhaustive manner the effects of a 
new parliamentary class and, in particular, that of the M5s on the functioning of Parliament. 
Moreover, it is equally difficult to examine the effects on intra-party relations. Future research-
es could be dedicated to the study of the level of internal cohesion within parliamentary groups 
and on the analysis of the relationship between the party in public office and others parties’ or-
ganizational faces. Alternatively, they could look at cohesion with other parliamentary groups 
(and above all with those groups characterized by a top-down candidates selection process), in 
relation to the voting choice on specific policies.  
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The M5S primaries have responded to two needs. Firstly, the selection of candidates for the 
general elections of February 2013. Secondly, the blocking of candidates who had not been in-
volved in the short history of the Movement and, therefore, potentially less-controllable by the 
national leaders. As documented, both aims have been substantially achieved. On the one hand, 
the online primaries were an effective tool for candidate selection in a party without an inter-
mediate subnational structure (apart from the Meetup leaders) and, therefore, with insur-
mountable difficulties in following traditional candidate selection methods. To this, the image of 
horizontal democracy associated with primary elections is added.   
On the other hand, the entry of external candidates was regulated by the nature of the com-
petition rules. Rules which were far from inclined to encourage participation, as much in terms 
of supply (access to candidacy) as for demand (possibility to vote).  
For this reason, a global assessment of the primaries of the M5s also brings us to reflect on 
the internal organization of the Grillo and Casaleggio party. From this point of view, first of all, a 
strong control by the central office emerges, both on the party on the ground, as in the public 
office. The consequences could be the dissatisfaction of two “party faces”. Firstly, the party on 
the ground complains
24
 that it is not able to participate fully enough in internal decisions. Sec-
 
24
 The dissatisfaction of a large part of the M5s activists is supported by results from a web survey car-
ried out by Candidate and Leader Selection after the online primaries. The web survey has been set up to 
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ondly, the corpus of elected could place distance between themselves and the central organiza-
tion or discover divergences within the group itself. In this context, it should be taken into con-
sideration that after every election the “working nucleus” of almost all parties becomes the 
elected body (Hazan 2006). It is therefore certainly no coincidence that the selection of candi-
date was influenced by the staff central control. And such a control was much stronger than a 
diffuse enthusiasm would have us believe. 
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